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KAPLAN AND "REGARDED AS":
DOES THE ADA DISCRIMINATE
BETWEEN REAL AND PERCEIVED DISABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) provides a
clear and far-reaching national directive with the purpose of
eliminating discrimination against people with disabilities. 2 The Act
extends protection not only to those who are actually impaired, but
also to individuals who are regarded as disabled.3  Congress
extended protection to so-called "regarded as" individuals because
they recognized that perceptions of disability are as disabling as the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairments.4 This
Comment examines a recent Ninth Circuit decision that severely
limits the protections of "regarded as" individuals.
In Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas,5 the Ninth Circuit held
that the ADA does not require employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to employees who are "regarded as" disabled.6 In
so holding, Kaplan adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d
138, 140 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). Courts and commentators tend to refer to
such individuals as "regarded as" or "perceived as."
4. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (approving the rationale expressed by the Supreme
Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).
The ADA defines disability in three ways. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Physical
impairments limiting a major life activity constitute the first prong of
disability. § 12102(2)(A). A record of such impairment is the second prong.
§ 12102(2)(B). The third and final prong recognizes disability in cases where
the individual is not physically impaired, but the employer regards the
individual as disabled. § 12102(2)(C).
5. 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
6. See id. at 1232.
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conclusion in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.,7 and rejected a previous
decision to the contrary in the First Circuit.
Reaction to Kaplan has been mixed. The Eleventh Circuit
criticized the decision for ignoring the basic principle that courts may
not selectively interpret statutes to obtain what they believe is a wiser
or more pragmatic result.9 Other commentators, however, have
lauded Kaplan as a common-sense acknowledgment that employers
cannot accommodate something that does not exist.l
0
Kaplan is best understood in the context of two landmark civil
rights acts: the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 197311
("Rehabilitation Act"). Both prohibit covered entities from
discriminating against disabled individuals. 12  The ADA covers
private employers, 13 state government services, 14 and public
accommodations,15 but excludes the federal government. 16  The
Rehabilitation Act covers entities receiving federal funding,
executive agencies, and the United States Postal Service. 17  The
ADA explicitly requires courts to construe the Act to grant at least as
much protection as the Rehabilitation Act provides.'
8
This Comment examines the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Kaplan and concludes it is erroneous. Part II briefly describes a
prima facie claim under the ADA, focusing on aspects relevant to the
holding in Kaplan. Part 111 summarizes the facts of Kaplan and its
procedural background. Part IV presents the Ninth Circuit's analysis
7. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1078 (2000).
8. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231. In Katz v. City Metal Co., the First Circuit
concluded "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodations.
See 87 F.3d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1996).
9. D'Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1238 (11th Cir.
2005).
10. See, e.g., Worker "Regarded As" Disabled Not Entitled to Reasonable
Accommodation, WASH. EMP. L. LETrER (Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, Wash.),
June 2003, at 3, 6.
11. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (as relevant to the employment
context, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 705, 791-94d (2000)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
13. See id. §§ 12111-17.
14. See id. §§ 12131-65.
15. See id. §§ 12181-89.
16. Id. § 12111(5)(B).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998).
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of Kaplan's ADA claim. 19 Part V argues that legal precedent renders
Kaplan erroneous, that the Ninth Circuit conducted a flawed exercise
in statutory construction when it interpreted the ADA. Part V closes
by observing that inconsistent usage of the lay and legal meanings of
the term "disabled" has led to the inadvertent conception of the issue
at hand. Part VI addresses the implications of allowing employers to
deny reasonable accommodations to "regarded as" plaintiffs.
Finally, Part VII concludes that the Ninth Circuit erroneously
decided Kaplan because it failed to follow precedent and incorrectly
applied principles of statutory interpretation to the ADA.
II. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF A CLAIM UNDER THE ADA
To appreciate the implications of Kaplan and to evaluate the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning, knowledge of the statutory structure of the
ADA and judicial decisions interpreting the Act is necessary. This
section briefly explains the most salient aspects of a claim under the
ADA.
The general rule against discrimination under the ADA is that no
covered entity may discriminate against people with disabilities at
any point in the employment process. 20 Thus, the key elements of a
claim of discrimination are as follows: (1) disability, (2) status as a
"qualified individual" with a disability, and (3) adverse treatment
because such individual is disabled.2'
"Disability" is a term of art with three alternative definitions: (1)
a physical or mental condition that substantially limits a major life
activity; (2) a record that such condition exists; or (3) being
"regarded as" having such condition.22 Congress intended any
individual prong to suffice to establish that an individual is disabled
for purposes of the ADA.23
19. Because the Ninth Circuit's holding is predicated on broad legal
principles and not narrowly tailored to the facts of the case, this Comment
focuses on the broad doctrinal aspects of the decision.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). The ADA specifically prohibits
discrimination in regard to "job applications procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.
21. See Broussard v. Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 1252, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1999).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450 ("If an individual meets any one of these three tests, he
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The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a
person with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodations, is capable of performing the essential functions of
the job that the individual holds or desires.
24
The ADA's "central" non-discrimination directive is to provide
reasonable accommodations. 25 Because various forms of reasonable
accommodations may suffice in any one case, the ADA lists only a
few as a guide on the matter.26 Rather than provide an extensive list,
the Act requires an interactive process to determine what, if any,
reasonable accommodations are available. 27 The Ninth Circuit has
held that an employer who is aware of an employee's need for
accommodation has an affirmative duty to engage the employee in
this interactive process.
28
Under the ADA, employers discriminate when they treat an
individual adversely because the individual falls within one of the
Act's three definitions of disability.29 The ADA lists seven specific
forms of adverse treatment. 30  Among these examples is an
employer's failure to make reasonable accommodations. Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to engage in the interactive
process constitutes discrimination.
32
With this framework in mind, the following sections describe
the pertinent facts, procedural background, and reasoning in Kaplan,
followed by four rationales for concluding its holding is erroneous.
or she is considered to be an individual with a disability for purposes of
coverage under the ADA.").
24. 42U.S.C. § 12111(8).
25. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39.
26. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (listing accommodations such as
making facilities accessible, restructuring job schedules, and acquiring
equipment or devices).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2005).
28. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir.
2003); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
30. Id. § 12112(b)(1)-(7).
31. id. § 12112(b)(5).
32. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000),
rev'd on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); see also Vinson v. Thomas, 288
F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
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lIII. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Kaplan arose from Frederick Kaplan's service as a deputy
marshal with the City of North Las Vegas ("the City").3 3 On May 3,
1995, after six years in the field, Kaplan injured his right wrist and
thumb during a training exercise.34 On May 23, 1995, the City
reassigned Kaplan to a light duty position as an "Inmate Worker
Coordinator."
3
On the same day that the City reassigned Kaplan, he began
receiving care at an outpatient rehabilitation center.36 Outpatient
rehabilitation continued throughout the summer of 1995. 37 In July,
his physician ordered testing for arthritis.38 On August 1, 1995,
doctors diagnosed Kaplan with rheumatoid arthritis.39 Upon final
examination, doctors concluded Kaplan's condition was ermanent.4
The City terminated Kaplan on August 31, 1995. It did so
because of the diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis and the concern that
the effects of the disease would permanently render Kaplan unable to
handle firearms.
42
B. Procedural Background
On June 7, 1996, Kaplan filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada, claiming that the City
violated the ADA.43 The district court granted the City's motion for
summary judgment, concluding Kaplan was not disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.44 Kaplan appealed, and the Ninth Circuit
33. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
34. Id. at 1228.
35. As an Inmate Worker Coordinator, "Kaplan was not required to arrest
or detain ... prisoners," nor was he required to use a firearm. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1229.
42. Id. According to the job description in effect at the time of Kaplan's
dismissal, a deputy marshal was required to use firearms. Id. at 1227.
43. Id. at 1229.
44. Id.
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reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the
issue of disability.
45
The City filed another motion for summary judgment.46 The
district court, concluding that Kaplan failed to prove he was a
qualified disabled individual under the ADA, granted summary
judgment for the City on April 22, 2002.47 Again, Kaplan appealed
48the summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit denied Kaplan's appeal,
holding that he could not perform the essential functions of the peace
officer position and that the City did not have a duty to accommodate
him.
49
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit identified two issues on appeal.50
The first was whether Kaplan could perform the essential functions
of his job without accommodation at the time the City terminated
him.51 The second was whether the City was required to provide
Kaplan with reasonable accommodations once it regarded him as
disabled, even though he actually was not.52 Together, these two
issues comprise the second element of the prima facie case-whether
Kaplan was a "qualified individual" with a disability.
53
A. Whether Kaplan Could Perform the Essential Function of a
Peace Officer Without an Accommodation
A claim under the ADA requires plaintiffs to show that they
could have performed essential job functions at the time of
termination.54 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Kaplan could not do
so.55 As a peace officer,56 Kaplan had to "restrain prisoners, use
45. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 2 F. App'x 727, 728 (9th Cir. 2001).
46. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1229.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1233.
50. Id. at 1227.
51. Id.
52. Id. Kaplan states the issue by using both the legal and lay meaning of
"disability." See discussion infra Part V.D.
53. Id. at 1229 n.4. For the prima facie elements, see supra text
accompanying note 21.
54. Id. at 1230.
55. Id.
56. The Ninth Circuit also refers to this position as a "deputy marshal." See
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firearms, and engage in hand-to-hand combat." 57  Neither party
disputed this description of Kaplan's duties.
58
Both parties also agreed that when the City terminated Kaplan,
he could not grasp objects without severe pain.5  Testimony further
established that Kaplan could not perform essential job functions
until one year after his termination.6 0 Thus, on the first issue, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Kaplan could not perform the essential
duties of his position without accommodation. The next section
describes the court's analysis of the second issue on appeal-
whether Kaplan was entitled to reasonable accommodations.
B. Whether Kaplan Was Entitled to Reasonable Accommodation
In broad doctrinal terms, the Kaplan court articulated the issue
as whether "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.62 Kaplan fell under the "regarded
as" prong of the ADA because he was fired based on a misdiagnosis
for rheumatoid arthritis. 6 3 The court noted a split in other federal
circuits with respect to this inquiry.64
1. Why the ADA Cannot Be Interpreted Literally
The Ninth Circuit first explained that courts must begin statutory
id. at 1227.
57. Id. at 1230.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1231.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
64. The Kaplan court noted that the weight of authority disfavored
interpreting the ADA to require accommodation to "regarded as" plaintiffs.
Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231 (citing Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17
(8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.
1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998)). In
addition, the Court also cited two cases holding to the contrary. Id. (citing
Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Jacques v. DiMarzio,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)). Since the Ninth Circuit
decided Kaplan, several more cases have held that the ADA does require
reasonable accommodations to "regarded as" plaintiffs. See, e.g., D'Angelo v.
Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1237 (1lth Cir. 2005); Kelly v. Metallics
W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth.
Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004).
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construction by attempting to give effect to a statute's plain
meaning. 65 The court identified the plain meaning of the ADA as
defining discrimination to be the failure of employers to implement
reasonable accommodations to qualified people with disabilities.
66
Further, the plain meaning of the ADA clearly does not distinguish
between people based on the three prongs of the disability
definition.
67
Although the language of the ADA at issue in Kaplan is
admittedly plain and unambiguous according to the Ninth Circuit,
Kaplan noted that some courts have considered the Act to lead to
bizarre results. 68 Thus, Kaplan initiated an inquiry beyond the literal
language of the act.
69
2. A Sensible Interpretation
The Kaplan court used two examples to explain why a literal
interpretation of the ADA could lead to absurd results. Without
explanation, the court first stated that if employees merely "regarded
as" disabled were entitled to reasonable accommodations, employees
would be better off "if their employers treated them as disabled[,]
even if they were not.",70  According to the Ninth Circuit, this
application would produce a result that does nothing to ameliorate
one of the stated purposes of the ADA-to dispel stereotypes that do
not accurately reflect the abilities of disabled individuals.7'
Second, the court reasoned that a rule that required reasonable
accommodation of "regarded as" plaintiffs, would discourage
72employees to inform employers about their abilities. Further, it
would dissuade employers from understanding all of their
65. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231-1232.
66. See id. at 1232 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000)).
67. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8) (2000)). The three-pronged
disability definition under the ADA to which Kaplan refers is the tripartite
disjunctive definition for that term. See supra text accompanying note 22.
68. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232 (citing Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907,
917 (8th Cir. 1999)).
69. lId (citing Royal Foods Co. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108
(9th Cir. 2001) for the proposition that courts "must look beyond the plain
language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd
result").
70. d.
71. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000)).
72 Id.
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employees' talents.73 Ultimately, the court concluded that requiring
reasonable accommodations for these plaintiffs would do nothing to
dispel the problem of discrimination against the disabled.74 It would
only provide a "windfall" for those employees who are merely
"regarded as" disabled.75
A contrary rule would waste limited employer resources on
individuals who were not disabled under the lay meaning of the
word.76 It would also needlessly divert such resources from assisting
individuals who suffered from actual disabilities and were in genuine
need of accommodation. 77 Therefore, the Kaplan court concluded
that "regarded as" plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable
accommodations.
78
V. ANALYSIS
The Kaplan court's reasoning is unpersuasive for several
reasons. First, the court failed to consider Supreme Court precedent
requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations under
the Rehabilitation Act irrespective of the disability-definition
prong.79 Because both Congress and the Supreme Court require the
ADA to grant at least as much protection as the Rehabilitation Act,
any decision reaching a contrary result, such as Kaplan, is
erroneous. 
80
Second, the Ninth Circuit previously held that the ADA requires
employers to initiate an interactive process and to implement
reasonable accommodations with employees whom they believe are
disabled. 81  The Kaplan decision contradicts this rule because it
holds that such employees are not entitled to reasonable
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir.
1999), for the observation that "regarded as" plaintiffs would receive a
windfall because of their employers' "'erroneous perception of disability"').
76. Id. Although Kaplan does not express it, its use of "disabled" is not the
term of art defined under the ADA; rather, it uses the lay meaning of the word.
See discussion infra Part V.D.
77. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232.
78. Id. at 1233.
79. See infra Part V.A.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 28.
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accommodations
8 2
Third, the Kaplan decision's exercise of statutory interpretation
contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Act reveals that it is unnecessary for courts to
apply statutory construction doctrines to the ADA's definition of
"disability" for the following reasons: (1) the language of the Act is
not ambiguous; (2) it does not thwart the overall statutory scheme;
and (3) it does not lead to absurd results.
8 3
Finally, the court's use of multiple meanings for the term
"disabled" is flawed. Congress has consistently used the same term
of art to define disability since it passed the Rehabilitation Act in
1973.84 Congress adopted that same term of art verbatim as the
definition of disability under the ADA.8 5 This long, consistent use of
a term of art to denote disability under the ADA suggests that the
Ninth Circuit's mixing of the lay and legal terms renders its analysis
erroneous as contrary to Congressional intent.
86
A. The ADA Does Not Discriminate
Between the Various Prongs of Disability
The ADA requires courts to interpret it as providing at least as
87much protection as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Ninth
Circuit has held that the ADA's legislative history demonstrates
Congress' intent that courts incorporate judicial interpretations of the
Rehabilitation Act into the ADA.
82. See infra Part V.B.
83. See infra Part V.C.
84. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450 ("The ADA uses the same basic definition of
'disability' first used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and in the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988.").
85. See id.
86. See infra Part V.D.
87. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12201(a) (2000) ("[N]othing in this [Act] shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under.., the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 .... "); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 69 ("[N]othing in the ADA is
intended or should be construed to limit the scope of coverage or to apply
lesser standards than are required under.., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").
88. Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995).
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The Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline" held that employers are required to provide reasonable
accommodations irrespective of whether disability is based on actual
impairment, a record of such impairment, or being "regarded as"
impaired.90  Kaplan, however, eliminated accommodations for
employees who are disabled under the "regarded as" prong. 91 Thus,
the Kaplan holding is erroneous because it does not grant at least as
much protection under the ADA as the Rehabilitation Act on this
same issue.
1. Each Prong of Disability Is on Equal Ground
Arline is the most relevant Supreme Court case addressing the
issue presented in Kaplan. In Arline, the county school board fired a
public school teacher after she suffered a third relapse of tuberculosis
within two years.92 The Plaintiff, Gene Arline, argued that she was
disabled, and as such, that she was protected under the Act.93 The
Court agreed that Arline was disabled because her tuberculosis was
an acute form affecting her respiratory system, which required a stay
at the hospital on several occasions. 94 Thus, she satisfied the "actual
impairment" and "record of impairment" prongs of disability.
The school board conceded that Arline had an actual
impairment.95 It argued, however, that it was justified in dismissing
Arline because of the threat her relapses posed to the health of
others.96 Thus the school board admittedly dismissed Arline because
it regarded her impairment as disabling.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and stated that
employers could not justify discrimination against employees by
distinguishing between the effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on the patient. 97 Also, the Court explained that
Congress was just as "concerned about the effect of an impairment
89. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
90. Id. at 281-85, 289 n.19.
91. See supra Part IV.B.
92. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
93. Id. at 276-77.
94. Id. at 280-81.
95. Id. at281.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 282.
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on others as it was about its effect on the individual. 98 The Court
then turned to the only unanswered question-whether Arline was an
otherwise "qualified individual" for the job of elementary school
teacher.
99
The Court approached this issue in two steps.100 First, it asked
whether Arline could perform "the essential functions" of the job in
question. 10 1 Second, it addressed whether the school board could
make reasonable accommodations for her.10 2 The Supreme Court did
not inquire into Arline's "entitlement" as the Kaplan court did;
10 3
rather, the Court focused on the school board and whether it could
provide reasonable accommodations. 10 4 Thus, in Arline, the Court
conducted an extensive analysis into the three definitions of
disability under the Act. Ultimately, the Court concluded that
employers must provide reasonable accommodations, irrespective of
whether disability is based on physical impairment, a record of such
impairment, or being "regarded as" so impaired.1
0 5
2. Kaplan Is Analogous to Arline
In Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit failed to address whether Arline
was binding precedent, although other circuits confronting the same
issue have so concluded. 1°6 In addition, Congress quoted Arline in
explaining its rationale for including "regarded as" under the
definition for disability:
[A]lthough an individual may have an impairment that does
not in fact substantially limit a major life activity, the
98. Id.
99. Id. at 287.
100. See id. at 287-88.
101. See id. at 287-88, 288 n.17 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)). Section
84.3(k) is the Rehabilitation Act equivalent to regulations promulgated under
the ADA and contains the same definition of a qualified individual. See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2005).
102. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
103. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
104. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-89, 287 n.17, 289 n.19.
105. See id.
106. See D'Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir.
2005) (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-89, 289 n. 19); see also Williams v. Phila.
Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004) (characterizing the
Arline decision as requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations
to "regarded as" employees).
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reaction of others may prove just as disabling. "Such an
impairment might not diminish a person's physical or
mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially
limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative
reactions of others to the impairment."'
0 7
Since Congress applied Arline in constructing this provision of the
ADA, Arline was therefore mandatory authority for Kaplan.
Moreover, the rule in Arline was directly on point. Generally,
when a U.S. Supreme Court case addresses a specific issue, a circuit
court is bound to follow the decision of the High Court on that
issue. 108 A circuit court may only deviate from the High Court's
precedent if the case under consideration is distinguishable from the
prior case, or there is some other principled basis for departure.
1°9
The following comparison of Kaplan and Arline reveals there is no
principled basis for distinguishing Kaplan.
Each case involved individuals who were physically impaired.
Frederick Kaplan sustained a serious injury to his wrist and thumb in
1995.110 Gene Arline suffered a relapse of tuberculosis three times in
two years.111 Each was terminated after having worked more than
five years for his or her employer. 12 Kaplan was hired in 1989 and
terminated in 1995; 113 Arline taught elementary school beginning in
1966 until the school board dismissed her in 1979.114
Each case turned on the issue of perceived disability. In Kaplan,
the City dismissed Kaplan only after learning doctors had diagnosed
him with rheumatoid arthritis. 115 The diagnosis was incorrect and
107. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 283).
108. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 601 (2005) ("[A] Court of Appeals is
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court until such time as the Supreme
Court informs it that the rule of decision has been changed.")
109. Id. at § 599 ("Stare decisis does not apply where the facts are essentially
different, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be
entirely inappropriate when a factual variance is introduced.").
110. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
111. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
112. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1227-28; Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
113. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1227, 1229.
114. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
115. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1229.
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Kaplan would later recover. 116  Arline's employer forced the
"regarded as" issue when it argued that it dismissed her because of
its fear that Arline's tuberculosis was contagious.' 7
True, Kaplan and Arline differ in that Kaplan filed suit under the
ADA,' 18 while Arline sued under the Rehabilitation Act.
119
However, the Supreme Court 120 and the Ninth Circuit12 1 have
recognized and followed Congress' mandate that the ADA grant at
least as much protection as the Rehabilitation Act.' 2  Moreover,
Congress took the statutory definition of disability under the ADA
directly from the Rehabilitation Act.
123
The Kaplan court construed the ADA to excuse failure to
accommodate in exactly the same context that Arline read the
Rehabilitation Act to require accommodation. Kaplan thus violated
the ADA's explicit mandate that courts construe it to provide at least
as much protection as the Rehabilitation Act.
124
116. Id.
117. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281. The school board acknowledged that Arline
was impaired by tuberculosis and that it was aware of her record of hospital
stays. Id. The school board argued, however, that it terminated Arline not for
these reasons, but rather, solely because it feared her condition would affect
others. Id. Because the defendant argued the first two prongs of disability
were irrelevant, the Court had to base its remand of the case on the "regarded
as" prong. See id. at 281-83.
118. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1229.
119. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
120. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998) ("The directive requires
us to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by...
the Rehabilitation Act.").
121. Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995)
("The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when
interpreting the ADA.").
122. "[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard
than the standards applied under.., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000).
123. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450; Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-32; Collings, 63 F.3d at 832
n.3 (noting that "[t]he ADA defines a disability in substantially the same terms
as the Rehabilitation Act" of 1973).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a); see also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-32; Collings,
63 F.3d at 832 n.3.
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B. Kaplan Creates a Contradiction Under the ADA
Similar to the Supreme Court's holding in Arline, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations that
govern the ADA and associated Ninth Circuit case law that interprets
these regulations also require employers to provide reasonable
accommodations irrespective of which statutory definition of
disability is implicated.
Congress authorized the EEOC to issue regulations to
implement the ADA.1 25 In turn, the EEOC outlined an "interactive
process" through which employers and employees may determine
what, if any, reasonable accommodations are necessary. 126  As
explained in the regulations and later approved by the courts, this
interactive process involves the employer and employee identifying
"the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations."
127
In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,12 8 the Ninth Circuit explained that
employers must initiate the process "without being asked" whenever
an employer:
(1) knows that the employee has a disability, (2) knows, or
has reason to know, that the employee is experiencing
workplace problems because of the disability, and (3)
knows, or has reason to know, that the disability prevents
the employee from requesting a reasonable accommo-
dation.l1a
An employer who is aware of an employee's need for
accommodation has a mandatory obligation to assist the employee in
identifying and implementing reasonable accommodations.
130
Moreover, failure to engage in the interactive process constitutes
discrimination. 131
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2005).
127. Id.
128. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
129. Id. at 1112 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902 (Mar. 1, 1999)).
130. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).
131. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116.
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The rules in Barnett and Kaplan apply when employers believe
an individual is disabled. Neither rule requires employers to confirm
their beliefs. If employers must implement reasonable
accommodations when they are "aware" an employee is disabled, it
follows that employers are also required to provide reasonable
accommodations to employees whom they regard, or perceive, as
disabled. Kaplan, however, reached the opposite result. Thus, after
Kaplan, employers must discuss reasonable accommodations with
employees they "know" are disabled, but the employees are not
entitled to reasonable accommodations if their statutory status as
disabled is instead based on their employers' perception, i.e., the
"regarded as" definitional prong.
The Barnett rule makes more sense within the context of the
ADA than does the Kaplan rule. Among its stated goals, the ADA
attempts to dispel myths and stereotypes about disability.
132
Interaction is certainly an effective means for achieving this worthy
goal. By contrast, the rule in Kaplan is unlikely to persuade
employees to inform employers about their disabilities, or to
persuade employers to clearly see all of their employees' talents.
133
The Kaplan court adopted a rule that contradicts prior Ninth
Circuit precedent set in Barnett. Moreover, Kaplan impedes the goal
of the ADA as compared to Barnett. If employers are indeed
obligated to initiate the interactive process when they perceive an
employee is disabled per the holding of Barnett, a fortiori, "regarded
as" individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations.
C. Guidelines of Statutory Interpretation Do Not Require the Ninth
Circuit to Look Beyond the Literal Language of the ADA
In addition to contradicting precedent, the Ninth Circuit
erroneously interpreted the ADA. The Kaplan court conceded that
the ADA is not ambiguous in its definition of disability or the rights
of the disabled to reasonable accommodations. 134 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that a literal interpretation of the ADA produced
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
133. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit failed to explain what leverage a
terminated "regarded as" employee would have to educate his former
employer. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
134. See id.
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"bizarre" or "absurd" results with respect to "regarded as" claims.
135
Consequently, the Kaplan court proceeded to develop what it thought
was a sensible meaning from the Act using methods of statutory
interpretation. 1
36
However, as explained below, a literal interpretation of the
language at issue produces neither bizarre results nor thwarts the
overall statutory scheme of the Act. 137  Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit did not persuasively show that any "duty of interpretation"
existed. 38 In the Ninth Circuit, the "duty of interpretation" only
arises if statutory language is ambiguous. 139  Otherwise, the sole
function of the courts is to enforce a legislative act according to its
terms. 14° Thus, where the language is plain and unambiguous,
statutory interpretation is not required. 14 However, notwithstanding
the strong presumption that the plain language of the Act expresses
Congress' intent, "a court must look beyond that plain language
where a literal interpretation.., would thwart the durpose of the
overall statutory scheme" or lead to an absurd result.14
1. The Language of the ADA at Issue in Kaplan Is Not Ambiguous
Kaplan acknowledged that the plain language of the ADA
strongly suggests that an employer's failure to provide reasonable
accommodations to an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability constitutes discrimination. 14 3  Furthermore, the Ninth
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1231-32.
137. See infra Parts V.C.2-3.
138. The language "duty of interpretation" is taken from Carson Harbor
Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Royal Foods Co. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.
2001). This language can be traced to an earlier Ninth Circuit decision. See
Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 917-18 (9th
Cir. 1975).
143. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003). Indeed, "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability" explicitly constitutes discrimination
under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Furthermore, this
language supports the conclusion that "regarded as" individuals are entitled to
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Circuit in Kaplan agreed that "the ADA's definition of [a] qualified
individual with a disability does not differentiate between the three
alternative prongs of the disability definition."' 144 The Ninth Circuit
did not assert that the language of the ADA is susceptible to more
than one meaning.145 They agreed that, "on its face," the language of
the Act is plain. 46 Therefore, the Kaplan court was bound by the
literal interpretation of the ADA, unless the literal interpretation
thwarts the overall statutory scheme or produces absurd results. As
discussed below, a literal interpretation does neither.
2. The Language in the ADA at Issue in
Kaplan Furthers the Overall Statutory Scheme of the Act
Requiring an employer to provide reasonable accommodations
to an otherwise "qualified individual" who is "regarded as" disabled
by the employer does not thwart the overall statutory scheme of the
ADA. Kaplan singles out one of several stated purposes for the Act
to support its argument: to decrease "stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of [people with
disabilities]." 147  In fact, this excerpt somewhat understates the
purpose of the ADA. In its entirety, the text of the Act cited by
Kaplan reads:
Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting
reasonable accommodations. Congress specified "known" limitations. The
only actor to which "known" can sensibly attach is the employer. Thus, where
an employer regards its employee as disabled, it is required to make reasonable
accommodations. Kaplan later concedes the issue is not an easy one. 323 F.3d
at 1232-33.
144. Id. at 1232 (quotations omitted).
145. See id. According to the plain meaning rule discussed by Kaplan in
part, and more fully in Carson Harbor Village, the "duty of interpretation"
arises when the language of a statute is ambiguous. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231-
32 (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
146. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232.
147. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)) (alteration in original). Indeed,
the square brackets in the quotation indicate paraphrasing by the Kaplan court.
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from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society. 148
The full text illustrates a broader purpose for the ADA than Kaplan
recognizes. As Congress explained when passing the ADA,
society's reaction to its own perception of an individual is as
disabling as any physical limitations flowing from actual
impairment.149  Moreover, Congress used the same definition of
"disability" in the ADA as it had in the earlier Rehabilitation Act
because "it has worked well." 150  Thus, the legislative history
supports the conclusion that requiring reasonable accommodations
for "regarded as" individuals does not thwart the purposes of the Act;
rather, it accomplishes the goals of the ADA.
3. Providing Reasonable Accommodations to
"Regarded As" Individuals Does Not Produce
Absurd Results in the Context of the ADA
As explained above, when a literal interpretation of a statute
would produce an absurd result, courts may look beyond the plain
language.' 5' With respect to providing reasonable accommodations
to "regarded as" individuals, courts and commentators offer various
hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the potential for absurd results.
The following hypothetical is drawn from the facts presented in
Weber v. Strippit, Inc.152 and illustrates the Ninth Circuit's concern
in Kaplan.1
53
A and B are at-will employees of Covered Entity (CE),
headquartered in State X. Each employee is based at home in State Y
and travels extensively on behalf of CE. A suffers a heart attack.
Doctors diagnose full recovery within six months. A's heart attack
does not substantially limit a major life activity, and he has never had
a physical impairment of any kind in the past. Therefore, he is not
disabled under the "actual impairment" or "record of impairment"
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added).
149. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453.
150. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990).
151. See supra Part V.C.
152. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999).
153. Kaplan adopts the Eighth Circuit's conclusion and rationale in Weber
without providing independent analysis. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232.
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definitional prongs of the ADA. During his recovery, A is able to
continue traveling for his job. B enjoys good health throughout.
CE decides to require all employees, including A and B, to
reside near its headquarters in State X. Although A is able to travel,
doctors advise against relocating for six months to avoid additional
stress during his recovery. B does not want to move until his
daughter graduates high school in six months. A and B consequently
refuse to relocate for six months. CE terminates each for their
refusal to relocate.
State X and State Y have construed the ADA to require
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to "regarded as"
individuals. If A can show CE's decision to terminate his
employment was based on its perception that he was disabled by his
heart attack, CE will have to provide reasonable accommodations in
the form of allowing A to delay relocation for six months. 154 B,
however, has no right to reasonable accommodations because CE
does not regard him as disabled.
A keeps his job because CE ultimately views the cause of his
relocation delay as stemming from his heart attack. Conversely, B
loses his job because CE merely views him as a considerate parent.
Thus, as Kaplan posited, "employees would be better off under the
statute if their employers treated them as disabled even if they were
not.' 155 The Ninth Circuit concluded that such results are absurd.
156
At first blush this conclusion seems logical, but on closer
examination the argument's faults become clear. Foremost, Kaplan
154. The federal circuits are split on several aspects of the reasonable
accommodation requirement under the ADA and the Supreme Court has only
addressed the issue on narrow grounds. See generally Stephen F. Befort,
Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S.
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 931, 934-949 (2003) (discussing
both the circuit court split and Supreme Court precedent). To avoid obscuring
the point of this hypothetical, assume that delaying relocation is a reasonable
accommodation in the jurisdictions of State X and State Y.
155. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. See Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the
Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of
Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REv. 901, 916-920 (1999-2000)
(providing a more elaborate example of absurd results which turns on the lay
meaning of "disability").
156. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232 ("This would be a perverse and troubling
result ... ").
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ignored Congress' concerns about the effects of perceived disability.
"[M]yths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."'
' 57
In addition, the House Report illustrates why the "regarded as" prong
is as vital as the other definitions of disability in the Act:
[A] person who is rejected from a job because of the myths,
fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be
covered under [the "regarded as" prong], whether or not the
employer's perception was shared by others in the field and
whether or not the person's physical or mental condition
would be considered a disability under the first or second
part of the definition.
58
Ultimately, the results with which the Ninth Circuit in Kaplan was
concerned are only absurd if courts use the lay meaning of the word
"disability." The ADA, its legislative history, and relevant case law
all suggest it is inappropriate to mix the lay and legal meanings of
"disability" when evaluating claims under the Act. Thus, when the
term "disabled" is used as Congress intended, employers must face
their prejudices by providing reasonable accommodations. This
understanding of the term will produce results consistent with the
overall statutory scheme of the ADA.
D. "Regarded As" Individuals Are Disabled Because
Congress Created a Term of Art Within the ADA
Encompassing a Broader Meaning of Disability
The preceding three sections each show ways in which the
Kaplan court erred. There is a common thread among each error
found in the Ninth Circuit opinion-careless usage of the term
"disabled."
The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that "[tihe ADA defines
'disability' with specificity as a term of art."'159 Thus, the precise
legal meaning of "disability" need not be derived from accumulated
legal tradition or historical practice. 160  When courts alternate
157. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
160. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 539 (1999) (explaining
how undefined terms may have default legal meanings based on accumulated
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between lay and legal meanings of a term, the courts' conclusions are
not credible. 161 The careless mixing of various forms of the term
"disabled" in Kaplan has led the Ninth Circuit to inadvertently create
an issue where none exists.
The ADA defines "disability" to include individuals who are
"regarded as" having an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity.162 Therefore, under the legal term of art adopted by
Congress, such an individual is disabled for purposes of the Act.
Double meanings are not uncommon in the law. Nevertheless, using
the term "disabled" with a modicum of discipline would eliminate
the issue presented in Kaplan and force courts to remain more
faithful to the Act.
As a result, employers would be required to reasonably
accommodate individuals whom they regard as "disabled." Once
employers were disabused of their misperceptions, the individual
would no longer be disabled under the "regarded as" prong.
Concomitantly, the employer would no longer be required to
continue the reasonable accommodations. 163  Thus, by extending
coverage to "regarded as" individuals, Congress achieves an elegant
resolution to a paradigmatic civil rights problem.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Ninth Circuit's mode of analysis is principled, rather than
fact-specific, and establishes a general rule. The doctrinal
implications of Kaplan are thus particularly troubling because future
courts will lack the discretion to decline to apply its rule.1
64
Foremost, courts must determine whether Rehabilitation Act
cases such as Arline165 will continue to have force in the ADA arena.
legal tradition and centuries of practice).
161. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 298-99 (2003) (O'Connor, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing as not credible the Court's
inconsistent usage of dictionary definitions when interpreting undefined
terms).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (2005); see
Sanders, 91 F.3d at 1354 n.2 (recognizing that the ADA defines "disability" as
a term of art).
163. Provided the individual does not qualify under the "actual impairment"
or "record of impairment" prongs of disability.
164. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 601 (2005).
165. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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Notwithstanding Congress' clear mandate that the ADA provide at
least as much protection as the Rehabilitation Act, 16 6 the Ninth
Circuit created a rule in Kaplan without addressing Arline,
suggesting that it and other such cases are not binding authority.
Similarly, it is now unclear whether Congress' mandate still holds
because the rule in Kaplan applies a lesser standard for "regarded as"
individuals than the prevailing Rehabilitation Act rule in Arline.
Moreover, the Kaplan holding renders application of the ADA
less certain. Are employers still required to initiate the "interactive
process" when they believe an employee is disabled? Under Kaplan,
this rule is unclear because employees merely "regarded as" disabled
are not entitled to reasonable accommodations. It would be absurd to
require employers to initiate an interactive process for the purpose of
finding a reasonable accommodation if the employee "regarded as"
being disabled is not entitled to reasonable accommodation.
For employers, Kaplan offers little solace. Employers must still
act when they perceive an employee is disabled. To assume Kaplan
applies, and thus forego taking action, employers must assume that
their perceptions about an individual's disability are false, i.e., their
employee is neither "physically impaired," nor does the employee
have a "record of such impairment." Inherently, however, employers
will believe their perceptions are correct. Furthermore, to act
prudently and avoid the risk of liability, employers will have to adopt
a course of action that assumes their perceptions are correct. Under
Barnett, that course of action must be to identify and implement
reasonable accommodations.
67
In the interim, while courts sort out the implications of the
Kaplan rule, "regarded as" individuals will have to protect their
rights without the benefit of one of the more robust aspects of the
ADA's prohibition against discrimination-the failure to provide
reasonable accommodations.
68
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kaplan can be summarized by
one inquiry-whether "regarded as" individuals are entitled to
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3,at 69 (1990), as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 492.
167. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
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reasonable accommodations. As explained above, the answer to this
question must be "yes." The Kaplan court erred by ignoring
Supreme Court precedent that requires employers to furnish
reasonable accommodations regardless of the disability-definition
prong involved. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit rule that requires
employers to initiate the "interactive process" when they believe an
employee is disabled supports the conclusion that "regarded as"
individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations.
Finally, its alternating use of both the lay and legal meanings of
the word "disabled" suggests that the Kaplan court was uneasy with
Congress' recognition of discrimination that arises solely because an
individual is inaccurately perceived as disabled. Congress, however,
made this choice after giving the matter great thought. As such, the
judiciary must go no further than to apply the ADA in a manner that
remains faithful to its text and affords the protections Congress
intended.
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